Online advertising is progressively moving towards a targeted model of programmatic ad buying in which advertisers bid for ad-slots on a per-impression basis. This model runs over the Real Time Bidding (RTB) protocol and is driven by the information provided by a large ecosystem of data collection companies that track users online. Concern about online tracking has spurred a huge public debate around data protection, as well as intense innovation around personal information management systems, markets, and business models. Core to all the above is being able to know the value of users' personal information.
INTRODUCTION
We live in an era where web and mobile service providers, in order to acquire or maintain a competitive edge over their competitors, have pursued an aggressive collection of user personal data. They are willing to buy such data [45, 4, 25] or give away for free useful services (e.g. Google Docs, google maps, skype, facebook, whatsapp etc.) in exchange of collecting data from the users [3, 20] . In fact, conservative estimates put the market of personal data to 100s of billions of euros [16, 47, 13] . The value of these data even affects the valuation of the IT companies involved, as it is often estimated as a function of their user base and, thus, the data they collect. In order to capitalize on these large amounts of ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-2138-9. DOI: 10.1145/1235 quality and quantity data, such companies participate in the advertising ecosystem, either as publishers, or advertisers, or data management platforms, or all of the above.
The need for more targeted and thus more effective advertisements made the collection of user personal data more aggressive and sometimes even intrusive [19, 21] . Elaborate fingerprinting techniques are detected [1, 15] , raising a huge public debate around the tradeoffs between innovation in advertising and marketing, and basic civil rights around privacy and personal data protection [29, 26] . Considering these increasing privacy concerns, a interesting question arises: Are users compensated in a fair way for the privacy they lose?
With this study, we aim at increasing awareness as to how much an online user is worth to the advertising ecosystem. To achieve this, we focus on this dynamic ecosystem and estimate how much companies are willing to pay for showing ads to online users. In particular, we leverage the RTB protocol, and the new, rapidly growing advertising model [11] of programmatic instantaneous auctions, which enjoy an annual growth rate of 128% [42] generating a total revenue of $15 billion in 2015 [23] . This model allows advertisers to evaluate the collected data of a given user at real time and bid for an ad-slot in her display.
We develop and evaluate a first of its kind methodology for allowing end users to estimate in real time their actual value for advertisers. Our methodology leverages the notification messages of the RTB protocol which carry the bidding and winning prices of each auction. Implemented as a browser extension, our method can tally winning bids for the advertisements shown to a user and display the resulting amount as she moves from site to site. Although RTB initially transmitted all prices in cleartext, more and more advertising companies use encryption to reduce the risk of being manufactured and falsified.
To remedy this issue, our methodology does the following as the user navigates on the web: a Analyses user web activity and extracts RTB prices from ads delivered to the user device as well as important features describing these prices.
b Obtains information about encrypted RTB prices found by running small, cheap and thus sustainable "probing" ad-campaigns with specific ad-exchanges (ADX) or by collaborating with such ADXs.
c Trains a machine learning model for estimating the value of different ads using the encrypted RTB prices from these campaigns. It also computes time-correction coefficients for cleartext prices to account for price changes due to time elapsed from past campaigns.
d Computes the overall user value by aggregating across detected cleartext and inferred encrypted RTB prices.
We note that the model predicting encrypted prices can be retrained based on the information received from new probing ad-campaigns launched at regular intervals or when large shifts in cleartext prices are detected. Thus, our methodology could follow the volatility of the advertising ecosystem. Individual impression prices may vary widely, but average impression prices are more stable according to our data.
To summarize, in this paper, we make the following main contributions:
1. We propose the first to our knowledge methodology to estimate, in real time, the overall cost of a user for the ad ecosystem using both encrypted and cleartext price notifications from RTB auctions.
2. We study the feasibility and efficiency of our proposed method using an analysis of real mobile user web logs.
3. We design and perform a 2-phase real world ad-campaign targeting ADXs delivering cleartext and encrypted prices in order to enhance the user weblogs prices.
4. We show that even with a handful of features extracted from the ad-campaign, our model performs very well (>80% accuracy, >0.90 AUCROC) and improves the overall estimation of a user's value by 55%, on average.
BACKGROUND ON RTB
In this section we briefly cover the most important aspects of RTB auctions and entities involved, and how they are relevant to our study.
The key role players
The key roles of the RTB ecosystem include the Advertiser, Publisher, DSP, Ad-exchange, and SSP and several interactions between them, as shown in Figure 1 . Note that it is very common for some (large) companies to play simultaneously different roles even inside the same auction.
Publisher: (e.g., CNN.com) is the owner of a website where users browse for content and receive ads (step 1). Each time a user visits the website, an auction takes place for each available ad slot. The ad impression of the winning advertiser is finally displayed in each auctioned slot of the website.
Supply-Side Platform (SSP): is an agency platform enabling publishers to manage their available ad slots and their pricing, allocate ad impressions from different channels (e.g. RTB vs. backfills) and receive revenue. SSP is also responsible for interfacing the publisher's side to multiple adexchanges (step 2). Various pieces of user's data (e.g. browsing history, demographics, location, cookie-related info, minimum acceptable price, etc.) are also passed to the adexchanges. Popular vendors selling SSP technology include: OpenX, PubMatic, Rubicon Project, Right Media.
Advertiser: is the buyer of ad slots in RTB auctions according to their marketing objectives, budgets, strategies, etc. The one with the highest bid wins the ad slot and places its impression on the screen of the website's visitor. Ad-exchange (ADX): is a digital marketplace that, similar to a stock exchange, enables advertisers and publishers to buy and sell advertising space through RTB auctions. ADX is responsible for hosting an RTB auction and distribute the ad requests and all the user information among all the interested auction participants (step 3). Typically these are second higher price Vickrey auctions [41] , thus, the charge price for the winner of the slot is the second highest submitted. Its main advantage is that it forces all bidders to have their bids truly reflect on what they think the value of the ad slot should be. The winning impression is served to the user's display within 100ms of the initiating call (step 6). Popular ad exchanges include: DoubleClick, MoPub, and OpenX.
Demand-Side Platform (DSP): is an agency platform employing decision engines with sophisticated audience targeting and optimization algorithms aiming to help advertisers buy the best-matched ad slots from ADXs in a simple, convenient and unified way. DSPs process data from several sources (step 4) such as ADXs, Data Management Platforms, etc. The result of this processing is translated to a decision in practice: Do I bid for this ad slot for this user, and how much?. If the visitor's profile matches the audience the advertiser has focused his ad campaign on, the DSP will submit to the ADX the impression and a bid in CPM (cost per thousand impressions [24] , typically in USD or e) on behalf of the advertiser (step 5). Popular DSPs include: MediaMath, AppNexus, Invite Media, Lucid Media.
RTB price notification channel
When an ADX accepts the higher bid for an auction, the winning bidder must be notified about his win to log the successful entry and the price to be paid. This notification can be implemented in two ways: (i) with a server-to-server message between ADX and DSP, (ii) with a message passed through the user's browser as a call-back to the DSP.
The first option is more straightforward and tamper-proof. No one can tamper or block these messages and companies can be sure their logs are fully synced at any time. In addition, DSPs can hide information about the transactions, the purchased ad-slots and the prices paid from the prying eyes of competitors. However, DSPs do not have any indication of the delivery or rendering of each ad, in order to inform their campaigns and budget. Considering the strict execution time requirement (the whole process must finish in ∼100ms) along with the rendering guarantees a DSP may require on the user's side, the second option turns out to be better and therefore the dominant one. Thus, the ADX usually piggybacks a notification URL (nURL) in the response that delivers to the user the winning impression (steps 6 and 7 in Figure 1 ). This nURL includes basically the DSP's domain, the charged price, the ad id, the auction id and other relevant logistics. As soon as the impression is rendered on the user's display, the browser notifies the DSP about (i) his win, (ii) the charged price, (iii) the fact that the impression was rendered successfully.
Encrypted vs. Cleartext Prices. The prices in nURLs can be in cleartext or encrypted form. Cleartext prices captured at the user's device can be easily tallied to estimate one part of the overall user value. The remaining part is difficult to obtain due to the 28-byte encryption scheme used in some cases. Such encryption cannot be easily broken [8] .
Past studies [33, 32] assumed that encrypted prices follow the same distribution as cleartext. Indeed, one may argue that the price encryption is to avoid tampering of reported prices, and thus encrypted prices probably follow the cleartext price distribution. This could be the case for a portion of them. However, it can also be that an encrypted price may be a sign of a higher value that the DSP wants to hide, for several reasons: aggressive re-targeting because of user's previous incomplete purchases, targeting users with higher spending habits, or users with specialized needs (e.g., sensitive products, expensive drugs, etc.). Therefore, an encrypted price may be used to reduce transparency over the bidding strategies of the participating DSPs, and prevent an external observer from assessing a competitor DSP's bidding methods or ad-campaigns. Thus, some DSPs may assume the extra computation overhead to reduce data leakage to competitors for users they track. In either case, our methodology, as described next, handles encrypted prices separately allowing us to account for any potential difference in their distribution from cleartext prices. By doing so, it removes one of the major shortcomings of existing studies [33, 32] .
Encrypted prices on the rise. In the early time of RTB, the charged prices of the nURLs were in cleartext as not many companies were engaged in this practice. However, lately, more ad companies adopt RTB and thus encryption to obfuscate their pricing strategies and avoid probable tamper attempts and falsifications. Encryption is a regular practice in desktop RTB ads (∼68% as reported in [32] with major supporters being DoubleClick, RubiconProject and OpenX). We detected a smaller portion in mobile RTB ads (∼26% as found in a mobile weblog we analyze in Section 4). However, we found that the percentage of pairs of ADX-DSP using encrypted price nURLs has been steadily increasing through time (Figure 2a ). This means that more mobile advertising entities use nURLs with encrypted prices.
In addition, we found that the mobile advertising entities with the larger RTB share deliver the highest portion of 2b). For example, MoPub is the top mobile ADX, responsible for 33.55% of the overall RTB ads, and 42.37% of the cleartext prices we detect. This means that if MoPub flips its strategy from cleartext to encrypted, the overall ratio of encrypted and cleartext prices will significantly change overnight, and an external observer or the involved user will lose a significant portion of information. Therefore, it is of high importance for the community to have a current methodology for estimating the value of encrypted prices, in order to measure the average cumulative value of a user in the advertising ecosystem.
METHODOLOGY
The goal of our study is to provide a methodology with which a user i can estimate in real time the accumulated revenue Yi her own personal data produce while she browses the web. We do that by analyzing RTB nURL prices the user received, either in cleartext or encrypted form. In our methodology, the plugin first identifies nURLs and extracts related prices, along with features useful for the modeling these prices. Cleartext prices can be aggregated directly but encrypted prices must be inferred. The plugin can share (with user's consent) extracted features and prices with a centralized repository responsible for: 1) performing dimensionality reduction of the parameters to describe prices, 2) running "probing" ad-campaigns based on the reduced parameter set to collected examples of encrypted prices in revealed form, 3) building a machine learning model to describe the encrypted (revealed) prices, 4) sharing the model with the participating users. Finally, and using the shared model, each user's plugin can compute a final user value. Figure 3 offers an overview of the methodology proposed.
RTB ad price extraction. From the user's weblogs of a time period T , we extract cleartext and encrypted charge price from nURLs . This process utilizes an extraction tool we built and describe in more detail in Section 4. As mentioned earlier, the two types of price notification are handled differently. The detected nURLs are also used for extracting a large set V of parameters that could affect charge prices (e.g., user location, publisher, time of day, day of week, size of ad, DSP, ADX involved, etc.). These parameters can be used to model prices in new ads, as explained next.
Cleartext prices. These prices can be aggregated in a straightforward fashion, thus producing the ad value for user i over such prices: Y ci = H yc, H := yc ∈ P c(T )ij and j ∈ Xc(T )i. Here, Xc(T )i is the set of ADXs sending cleartext price notifications to corresponding DSPs during T as found in user i's weblogs, and P c(T )ij is the set of cleartext price notifications for user i and ADX j ∈ Xc(T )i. Price Modeling Engine. The vector V of different parameters, along with a sample of instances of encrypted {y e }i and cleartext {yc}i prices of user i, can be anonymously contributed to a central repository, similarly to other works on data transparency in advertising (e.g., Floodwatch [39] ). Such parameters related to prices can be used to train a machine learning model for inferring encrypted prices with the aid of "probing ad-campaigns". This aggregated collection allows for more accurate modeling of prices, as data from multiple users and ad-campaigns served from various ADXs contribute better to the understanding of the important factors affecting RTB prices in different setups. The repository performs dimensionality reduction of set V into a subset S ⊆ V that describes well the variability of cleartext prices, but is also small to make the probing ad-campaigns feasible. Using S, probing campaigns provide encrypted but revealed prices (see next). Then the repository can model encrypted (revealed) prices using standard machine learning methods such as linear regression for computing an exact value, or random forests for computing a class (level) price, given S. The trained model M e(S) takes as input a vector of values for the parameters in S, and outputs the estimated value ye(S) of the encrypted price y e (S): ye(S) ∼ Me(y e (S)).
Probing Ad-campaigns. A way to obtain insights on encrypted prices is to collaborate directly with an ADX that sends such prices. However, we consider this to be the rare case, since ADXs are unwilling to share such data for free. Instead, we propose to run ad-campaigns through such ADXs and use their reports to model encrypted prices.
These campaigns can be optimized to target the top ADXs sending encrypted prices with a specific set of experimental setups to cover all possible scenarios from the small parameter vector S to be kept short, efficient and cheap. Given that the prices do not change drastically over time, these campaigns can be executed every few months to collect probing data for time-shift correction and increased coverage of more ADXs. Having such campaigns launched from a centralized location allows for more accurate and cost efficient price modeling that can be shared across all participating users in the same area or country. Furthermore, the campaigns can be crowd-funded (e.g. like Wikipedia), thus contributing to an independent and sustainable platform that can scale better across users, countries, and ADXs covered. ADXs could in principle fight back and try to identify and block such campaigns, but their huge clientele combined with the low volume of such campaigns makes the detection very difficult.
Using the most important parameters extracted in set S, we construct various experimental setups s ∈ S ⊆ V that can be used to deploy such ad-campaigns over a short period of time T . These setups combine different values of control variables that are important for an ad-campaign such as location of the user, size of ad, time of day, day of the week (more details in Section 6). With the results of these campaigns (in essence, charged prices for RTB ads that fulfil a given setup s), the modeling engine can train a model to estimate the value of new ads with a given setup s close to one tested, i.e. s ∼ s ∈ S.
Inferring encrypted prices. The encrypted prices for user i can be characterized by vector S extracted earlier. In order to infer their value, we utilize the machine learning model M e(S) built by the engine and distributed to participating users. Given these estimated values ye(S)i, we can compute the aggregate value over encrypted prices for user i:
Y ei = H ye, H := ye ∈ P e(T )ij and j ∈ Xe(T )i. Here, Xe(T )i is the set of ADXs sending encrypted price notifications during T found in user i's weblogs, and P e(T )ij is the set of encrypted price notifications for user i and ADX j ∈ Xe(T )i.
Total cost. The overall value of the user for the time period T analyzed can be stated as:
If a newly participating user would like to bootstrap their cumulative value from a longer past time period DT > T , then an average cumulative value per user can be used, computed over multiple users' prices contributed to the platform
FEATURE EXTRACTION
We assess the feasibility and effectiveness of our methodology by collecting a year long dataset containing weblogs from 1594 volunteering mobile users. Our users agreed to use a server of our control as a proxy, thus allowing us to monitor their outgoing HTTP traffic 1 . As a result, we were able to collect a large dataset D of 373M HTTP requests (Table 1) spanning the entire year of 2015. Note that though our dataset consists of HTTP-only traffic, in principle our approach works with HTTPS as well, using as input the contributed data of the users as can be seen in Figure 3 .
RTB price extraction & analysis
To analyze our dataset, we implemented an HTTP Trace analyzer capable of detecting and extracting RTB-related traffic. To detect RTB nURLs it applies pattern matching against a list of macros we collected after (i) manual inspection and (ii) studying the existing RTB APIs [35, 10, 34, 22, 30] used by the dominant advertising companies nowadays. This way, our tool locates the price notifications of the existing RTB auctions in the dataset and extracts the charged prices (after filtering out any bidding prices may co-exist in the nURL). Other operations carried out by the tool, include: (a) separation of mobile web browser and application originated traffic, (b) extraction of device-related attributes from the user-agent field (type of device, screen size, OS etc.), (c) creation of cooperating ADXs-DSPs pairs by leveraging the nURLs were the ADX informs the bidder (i.e. the DSP) about its auction win.
There are different algorithms DSPs may use for their decision engines which can take various features as input, each affecting differently the bidding price and thus the charged price of the ad-slot. In order to identify the most significant parameters, we extracted several features from the nURLs of our dataset such as mobility patterns, temporal features, user interests, device characteristics, ad slot sizes, cookie Figure 9 : Ad-slot size popularity through time. Table 2 : Features extracted by summarizing data from parameters embedded in each price notification detected in the dataset for users and advertisers.
synchronizations, publisher ranking, etc, and we present the analysis of the most interesting here ( Table 2) . We classify these features in 3 categories: geo-temporal state of the auction, user's characteristics, and ad-related.
Geo-temporal features
An important parameter that could affect a price of an ad-impression in a RTB auction is the user's current geolocation. Therefore, in the our dataset we extract every user IP address and using the publicly accessible geoIP database of MaxMind [28] we map each IP to its city level. In Figure 4 , which presents the min, median, max, 20th and 95th percentile of the charged prices, we see that although the median values are relatively lower in large cities, the fluctuation of their price values is higher.
Another important feature is time, and specifically the time of day and day of week. This is important due to the different level of attention a user can give to an ad and the amount of users online at a given hour of the day (e.g., working hours vs. afternoon's free time, or weekdays vs. weekends). From Figure 5 , although the median charge prices are of similar range, the hours close to noon tend to have more charge prices with increased values.
User-related features
By parsing the user-agent (UA) header information, the analyzer classified traffic and inspected the different fingerprints the UA leaks (specifications of process virtual machine (e.g., Dalvik or ART) or kernel (e.g., Darwin) etc.), operating system, browser vendor etc. As a result, we are able to identify the type of device (PC or mobile), the different types of mobile OSes (Android, iPhone, Windows phone) and if the traffic was generated from a mobile application or a mobile web browser.
In Figure 6 , we see the percentage of RTB traffic for different OSes over time. As expected, Android and Apple dominate, owning the larger portions of the market through the entire year. Then, we extract the traffic originated from the most popular ad-entity, MoPub [31] , and analyze the charged prices of the ad-impressions rendered in the different OSes. In Figure 7 , and considering median values, iOS based devices tend to receive higher RTB prices.
Inference of the user's interest. The browsing history of a user is highly related with her interests. By monitoring the websites a user visits through time, an external observer could infer her interests quite accurately.
In order to enrich the set of features with user interests, we collect all the websites each user visits across her whole network activity. Such information is available to the RTB ecosystem as well, usually stored separately in each adexchange or aggregated in data management platforms. To extract the interests from the visited websites we retrieve the associated categories of content for each website according to Google AdWords [18] . Then, we aggregate across groups of categories for each user and get the final weighted group of interests for each user in the form of IAB categories [5] . In Figure 8 , we see the distribution of the generated costs for the different IAB categories for a 2 month portion of our dataset for the top ADX (MoPub).
Ad-related features
Our analyzer categorizes the content of the HTTP requests based on their domain, as well as their URL parameters used at different stages of filtering. At a first stage, the domain based categorization, we integrated the blacklist of Disconnect, a popular adblock plugin [9] , which categorizes domains in 5 groups based on the content they deliver: (i) Advertising, (ii) Analytics, (iii) Social, (iv) 3rd party content, (v) Rest. Our analyzer can also integrate more than one blacklists (e.g., Adblock Plus' Easylist, Ghostery's blacklist, etc.). Finally, the analyzer refetches each imagerelated requests embedded in URLs and measures its size in pixels. If these are 1-by-1 pixel images, commonly known as web beacons are accounted as such.
To make sure that it detects the highest number of advertising (and especially RTB-related) requests possible, our analyzer applies a second filter by parsing the URL parameters for any RTB-related parameters (as they are defined in openRTB [22] ) and also RTB-related keywords collected after manual data inspection. Such parameters in an nURL are used to denote not only the bidding and charge prices, but also the ad impression ID, the bidder's name, the size of the auction's ad-slot size, the carrier etc.
Ad-slot sizes. Some ad entities in our dataset use as parameter the size of the auctioned ad-slot. In Figure 9 , we see that 300x250 ad-slots dominated the dataset from May on. In fact, 300x250 ad slots (aka MPUs or Medium Rectangles) tend to have more ad content available from advertisers, so they can increase earnings when both text and image ads are enabled. Ad slots 320x50 and 728x90 sizes are also very popular. Slots 728x90 (aka Leaderboard ads or banners) are usually placed at the top of a page, so as to be seen by the user immediately when the page loads. Slots 320x50 (aka large mobile banners) are similar to Leaderboard ads but with twice their height.
We also expect that the more space an ad-slot covers in a user's display, the higher the price will be. To verify this intuition, we isolated the traffic of an ad entity (i.e. Turn [40] ) carrying the ad-slot size in its nURLs along with the associated charged prices. In Figure 10 , we see that the most expensive ad-slots for an advertiser are in fact not the largest ones, but the MPU and Monster MPU (300x600) ad slots with median prices of 0.47 and 0.39 CPM respectively. However, from Figure 11 , the increased popularity of MPU and Leaderboard banner ad slots, allows these two types of adslots to accumulate 64.3% and 20.6% of the total RTB revenue of Turn in our dataset, respectively. Our results verify past resources [12, 2] regarding the more expensive ad-slots.
MODELING CLEARTEXT PRICES
In order to perform ad-campaigns that are both effective and cost efficient, we need to select a subset of features S ⊆ V from the available ones V that best describe the RTB prices found in the historic dataset D. This set should explain as much of the variability of prices as possible, but should also be small. The fewer features we select as important, the smaller the cost of running probing ad-campaigns to collect representative RTB prices using these features.
First, for normalization, we applied a log transformation on the extracted cleartext prices found. Then, we applied a clustering of the prices into 4 classes, using an unsupervised equidistance model that finds the optimal splits between given prices using a method of leave-one-out estimate of the entropy of values in each class. Next, we filtered out features that did not vary at all (i.e., constants) or had very high variance (99%) (i.e., likely to be noise). As a final step, dimensionality reduction (or feature selection) techniques such as PCA or random forests can be used [37] . We chose random forests (RF, an ensemble of decision trees built using a random subset from the available features) because it take into account the target variable (cleartext price), it can be trained quickly on large datasets and generally does Table 4 : Basic filters used in controlled ad-campaigns in Spain. In total, 144 experimental setups were attempted.
not overfit the given data. The RF models were trained using subsets of semantically related features from the available feature set and the best features from each subset were selected based on their power to describe the price distribution. In summary, we grouped features in the following sets: A) time, B) http-related, C) advertisement-related, D) DSP-related, E) publisher/host interests, F) user http statistics (historical), G) user interests (historical), and H) user locations (historical). We also tried selecting representative features out of each set to create minimal combinations. In total, we tried 10s of feature subsets and combinations. Table 3 shows the best results from the subset feature exploration (using standard machine learning metrics such as precision, recall, weighted area under the ROC curve (AU-CROC) and out-of-bag error. Considering the performance of the features to explain price classes, as well as the size of sets used, we conclude that an optimal subset that performs very well and is small enough to allow cost efficient ad-campaigns is a set that combines features from different groups. In particular, (also confirming with an ad-campaign expert) we select the following features to be used for the probing ad-campaigns (next): {application/web-browsing, device type, user location, time of day, day of week, ad format (size), type of website, ad-exchange}.
PROBING AD-CAMPAIGNS
In order to estimate the average cumulative value of a user from the ad ecosystem using RTB price notifications, we need to take into account the prices sent both in cleartext and encrypted form. We also need to consider how much these prices can change over time. One way to receive data about the prices of encrypted nURLs is to collaborate directly with ADXs or DSPs. This is not likely to occur however, since such companies guard carefully this information for a variety of reasons such as, confidentiality of contracts with customers, concerns about competitors, etc.
Instead, we propose another approach -run controlled adcampaigns with specific ADXs just like an ordinary customer would do. We considered ADXs for encrypted prices such as DoubleClick, OpenX, RubiconProject and PulsePoint, as well as ADXs that send cleartext prices such as MoPub (the top mobile ADX). These ad-campaigns can be designed and executed with the help of a single or few DSPs any time, with little overhead and a small budget of a few hundred euros each. Moreover, they can be blended with other real campaigns to make them more difficult to detect. Once designed, they can be automated and re-launched as frequently as needed, e.g., every few months or when the detected cleartext prices deviate from historical data.
Ad-campaign Setups
The basic idea is to construct various experimental setups s ∈ S that can be used to deploy an ad-campaign for each, over these selected ADXs. These setups combine different values of control variables that are important for an adcampaign:<user location, web-interaction type, time of day, day of week, device type, OS, ad-size, ADX>. For example, an experimental setup could be this: <Madrid, app,12am-9am,weekday,smartphone,iOS,320x50,MoPub> (144 setups, Table 4 ). By running such controlled ad-campaigns, we can receive ground truth data about encrypted prices, thereby allowing us to train our classifier. Campaigns with ADXs that deliver cleartext prices also allow us to compare prices in different times and thus compute any shift in the price distribution due to time passed between the collection of dataset D and present time.
Two important questions are how many ad-campaigns and impressions per campaign are enough to acquire a good approximation of the mean of price distribution per campaign. For this, we analyzed the ad-campaigns found for MoPub in D. We identified 280 such campaigns, with mean and standard deviation of charge price of 1.84 and 2.15 CPM respectively. Using the 144 setups proposed, we can approximate to more than 95% CI the mean price of campaigns observed in the wild, assuming a margin of error 0.35 CPM. Also, considering the distribution of prices within the largest of ad-campaigns detected for MoPub with 1.8k impressions, we can approximate to 95%CI the mean price of a campaign, assuming a margin of error 0.1 CPM and minimum of 185 impressions.
Using these as guidelines, we executed two rounds of different ad-campaigns to collect data on prices. Note at this point, that our ad-campaigns advertised a real service in order to avoid polluting the users with meaningless impressions. The first round (A1) was executed for 2 weeks in May 2016 and utilized the 4 ADXs mentioned earlier that encrypt price notifications and targeted publishers of many IAB categories. The second round (A2) was executed with the same experimental setups as A1 during June 2016, but in this case the DSP was instructed to use only MoPub, while still targeting similar IAB categories of publishers. In both campaigns, the DSP was given an upper bound on the bidding CPM price, to safeguard that they will not consume the allotted budget very quickly. On the other hand, the DSP was instructed to bid in a dynamic manner, as low or high as needed to get the minimum of impressions delivered for the various experimental setups we requested. Overall, we managed to receive for all setups, over 600k impressions displayed with encrypted price notifications to more than 200 publishers, and over 300k impressions with cleartext price notifications to more than 300 publishers, reaching audiences of 6 IAB categories common to both price notification types (Figure 1 ).
Price Distributions
The CDF price distributions shown in Figure 13 , demonstrate interesting points on the prices extracted from the two ad-campaigns and dataset D. First, we see that the price distribution of MoPub (2015) is similar to all ADXs, either when considering a 2 month period or a full year. Hence, we can study MoPub as a representative example and extrapolate lessons for the rest of the ADXs. Second, the price distribution of cleartext prices from A2 (MoPub) are of higher median value and can be used to establish the price shift due to time difference between the time T the dataset was collected, and T when the campaigns begun. In reality, this price shift can be detected evenly across multiple probing ad-campaigns (e.g., once per quarter of year). Finally, as a response to our motivating question regarding encrypted prices, we see that the price distribution of encrypted prices from A1 is distinctly different and of larger median value than the cleartext prices of A2 or D.
Cost paid vs. IAB category
In order to examine more thoroughly how the different IAB categories affect the charge prices of the different RTB auctions, we take a chunk of our dataset (spanning through a 2 month period) and, as described in Section 4, we extract the IAB categories for each publisher. To ensure the validity of our results and eliminate possible biases, we use the charge prices from only one advertising company, Mopub, which is the most popular owning 34% of the RTB ads in our dataset. As we see in Figure 8 , there are very costly categories like IAB3 (i.e. Business related content) with an average charged price of up to 5 CPM for the 50% of the cases. On the other hand, there are categories like IAB15 (i.e. Science related content) which are unable to draw prices higher than 0.2 CPM for the 50% of the cases.
Next, in Figure 12 , we compare the overlapping IAB categories of the RTB impressions we took from (i) the 2 months Mopub dataset, (ii) the set of cleartext prices from the adcampaign on MoPub (A2), (iii) the set of encrypted prices from A1. Note that in some cases, the results from the dataset vary more than in the ad-campaigns. This is to be expected as the dataset includes prices from numerous DSP-ADX pairs for many ad-campaigns running in parallel, whereas our two ad-campaigns are more targeted to specific DSP-ADX pairs.
Regarding the cleartext prices of different IAB categories, although the median prices are usually in the same order of magnitude, they are higher in the case of the recent adcampaign contrary to the 2 month dataset. We believe that this difference is due to the time shift between the dataset collected in 2015 and the ad campaign performed in 2016. In addition, we see that the median price is always higher in case of encrypted prices compared to the cleartext prices of the second ad-campaign and the dataset.
TOTAL USER VALUE
Encrypted Price Modeling. Using the data collected from the first round of ad-campaigns with various parameters, we trained a machine learning classifier to predict prices of encrypted prices. As a first step, we performed similar preprocessing as earlier for the cleartext prices (normalization and clustering to 4 classes of well balanced groups). Next, we trained a random forests model to predict the class of an encrypted price, based on the available parameters S. Using features such as city of user, day of week and the time the ad was delivered, ad size, mobile OS of the user's device, IAB category of the publisher, ADX used and device type, our classifier can achieve 82.3% accuracy and 0.96 of weighted area under the ROC curve (AUCROC). When the publisher used is also taken into account in the model, the performance of the classifier increases to 95% and 0.99 AU-CROC. However, this is classic overfitting and we should caution that the publishers used in the ad-campaigns are just a subset of the thousands of possible publishers that can be found in real weblogs. Therefore, we chose to use the model without the publisher as part of its input features. Next, this model was used for the estimation of the encrypted prices of nURLs found in the weblogs of each user, given the matching parameter values from S ⊆ V .
Cumulative User Value. We use the classifier to estimate the encrypted prices of ads found in each user's weblogs. We also use a time-correction coefficient for the cleartext prices computed from the second round of ad-campaigns. This allows us to consider the increase in prices due to time difference from the weblog collection (2015) and the adcampaign execution (2016). In Figure 14 , we see that some users are more costly than others. Specifically, up to 73% of the users cost < 100 CPM through the whole year for the ad ecosystem in the given dataset. On the other hand, for ∼ 1.85% of users, the advertising ecosystem spent 1000-10000 CPM for the same time period. Using our method for estimating cumulative value due to encrypted prices and time-correction, about 60% of users had an increased average cumulative cost of ∼ 55% on top of their cleartext value.
These users had a median of 14.3 CPM added to their total value, with some extreme cases of 1000-5000 CPM.
RELATED WORK
The rapid growth of RTB-based advertising has drawn attention from both the corporate and research community. As a consequence, there are several studies aiming to explore the economics of the RTB ad ecosystem. In [46] , the authors provide an insight to pricing and an empirical analysis of the technologies involved. The authors use internal data of an ADX and they study its bidding behaviors and strategies. In [44] , the authors propose a winning price predicting mechanism by leveraging machine learning and statistical methods to train a model using the bidding history. Their predicting approach aims to help DSPs fine-tune their bids accordingly.
In [33] , the authors perform an extensive privacy analysis of cookie matching in association with the RTB advertising. Similar to our approach, they leverage the RTB nURL to observe the charged prices and they conduct a basic study to provide some insights into these prices by analyzing different user profiles and visiting contexts. Their results managed to confirm that when the users' browsing histories are leaked, the charged prices tend to be increased. Similarly, in [32] , the authors propose a transparency enhancing tool, which shows to the users the RTB charged price every time a RTB auction is performed. Furthermore, they collect profiled and un-profiled data from a browser extension and a crawler respectively, and they compare the RTB prices, the bidding frequency and the inter-relations among ADXs and DSPs. Contrary to our study, both studies use a relatively small dataset of desktop users and they estimate the total revenues using only the cleartext prices based on the arbitrary assumption that encrypted and cleartext prices follow the same distributions.
In [17] , the authors use a dataset of several users' HTTP traces and provide rough estimates of the relative value of users by leveraging the suggested bid amounts for the visited websites based on categories provided by the Google AdWords. FDTV [7] is a plugin that informs users in real-time about the economic value of the personal information associated to their Facebook activity. Although similar to ours, our approach works for all HTTP activity of mobile users. Carrascal et al. in [6] perform a user study to measuring how the users value their own offline and online personal data and how much would they sell them to advertisers. In [36] , the authors propose "transactional" privacy, a mechanism which allows the users to decide what personal information can be released and receive compensation from selling them.
Finally, a group of journalists of the Financial Times, created an interactive calculator [14] to explore how valuable the users' data are for the ad-companies. This calculator is based on the analysis of industry pricing data from a range of sources in the US. Data pricing.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this study, we develop a first of its kind methodology to estimate the value of a user for the programmatic ad buying ecosystem. Our approach is based on tapping on the RTB protocol to collect cleartext and encrypted prices of the winning notifications. To estimate the value of the latter, we train a machine learning model using as ground truth prices obtained by running small "probe" ad-campaigns. We study the feasibility and efficiency of our methodology using a year worth of user browsing data as well as two ad-campaigns.
From our methodology, we found that an average user costs a mere $0.01-0.1/year for advertisers. However, some users could be more costly, in the range of $1-10. As an exercise, we can attempt to extrapolate an overall value based on the total advertising that a user may experience, both from RTB and regular advertising, and also via both HTTP and HTTPS traffic. If we assume that RTB ads are about a third of the overall advertising [42] , and assuming that users cost the same way in advertising, regardless of the method the ad is delivered, then the value of such a highend user increases to $3-33. Furthermore, if we assume that users receive advertising in a similar fashion in both HTTP and HTTPS, and HTTPS is about 70% of the total traffic delivered to the user [38, 27] , then such a user's value increases to $10-100. Even if a portion of that value is actually paid to the users-owners of the data used, the user could take advantage of it to purchase discounted online services: digital newspapers (avg.price of a digital subscription to a news outlet is $3.11/week [43] , Forbes: $9.99/6 months, NYT: e3.5/week, Economist: e57/12 weeks), online storage (Dropbox: e8.25/month for 1TB, Gdrive: $9.99/month for 1TB), movies (Amazon Prime: $10.99/month, Netflix: 7.99e/month).
Even though an online web economy where users negotiate the value of their personal data has been envisioned in the past (e.g., [6] ), there have been no practical tools to facilitate such markets. Our study offers a first of its kind tool that empowers users to negotiate on better grounds their online privacy and the use of their personal data from advertisers and other Internet companies. We are currently developing a mobile browser extension and as a next step we plan to release it to users to inspect the efficiency of our approach in the real world.
